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 i 
Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I offer a new interpretation of the principles of 
Naturalistic philosophy that are relevant to the philosophy of mind.  In 
doing so, I attempt to accomplish the broader task of showing how we 
can make significant progress in our thinking about consciousness by 
first offering new conceptual foundations that can ground our theorizing, 
and then applying these new ideas to specific problems in the field.  The 
thesis first articulates the advantages of Naturalism, properly understood, 
as a valuable methodological alternative to traditional approaches to 
problems in the field.  Next, I explore what we can distill from work in 
Situated Cognition Research (understood as an extension of my 
interpretation of Naturalism) which will be useful in truly appreciating the 
Naturalist’s theoretical starting point, our conceptual foundation for work 
in the philosophy of mind.  The thesis proceeds to show how the 
phenomenon of intentionality is to be understood given the principles of 
Naturalism, and a naturalistic account of intentionality emerges.  I 
conclude with a consideration of the implications that a naturalistic 
account of intentionality has for our understanding of the nature of 
consciousness in general. 
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 1 
1.  Introduction 
 
 One of the primary goals of the present work is to exhibit the value 
of taking a fresh approach to the philosophy of mind.  The contemporary 
conceptual landscape seems fraught with difficulties inherited from 
problematic thinking about the complexities of consciousness and its 
place in the world.  We should feel compelled to challenge and, if 
necessary, discard any metaphysical assumptions that get in the way of 
real progress in our attempts to articulate the nature of minds.  And, if 
real progress is to be made at all, by rejecting traditional assumptions 
and approaches to the problems of consciousness, we will have to offer 
an alternative theoretical or methodological starting point that transcends 
the old difficulties and gets us to the core of the philosophy of mind. 
 My approach is broadly naturalistic: I will offer my own 
interpretation of Naturalism as the theoretical and methodological 
starting point that should be foundational in our thinking about minds in 
the world.  The principles that I will argue are central to a naturalistic 
approach to the philosophy of mind will be shown to offer a way out of 
the old conceptual difficulties, and provide a new method of 
conceptualizing consciousness and its place in the world which honours 
undeniable features of our experiences as conscious, rational agents.  
With this naturalistic approach in hand, it becomes clear that 
consciousness cannot be understood in isolation from its complex 
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relations to the world, specifically those that are central to action and 
perception.  And the undeniability of these relations, not a metaphysical 
belief about the kinds of things that exist in the world, must drive our 
theories.  This is philosophical bedrock. 
 After articulating the details of this naturalistic approach, I proceed 
to analyze the relation of intentionality, which is a central, relational 
feature of consciousness.  By applying the principles of Naturalism to the 
development of an account of intentionality, we are brought directly to 
the core of the philosophy of mind.  In articulating the details of 
intentionality as an informational relation, an informational theory of 
consciousness emerges which consolidates all the crucial concepts 
surrounding consciousness into a detailed unified theory of minds in the 
world.   
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2. Philosophical and Methodological Background 
 
It is always necessary in philosophy to be clear about the 
metaphysical assumptions that we make when approaching a particular 
philosophical problem.  This is certainly the case in the philosophy of 
mind.  The task of articulating the nature of minds and how they are 
related to the world—the problem that lies at the heart of the philosophy 
of mind—challenges philosophers to make explicit their deepest 
metaphysical assumptions about themselves and about the world they 
occupy.  Divisions among theorists in the field follow from the various 
deeply rooted conceptual commitments that philosophers hold about the 
mind and its place in the world.  These conceptual commitments, which 
drive the approaches theorists take to issues in the philosophy of mind, 
have produced a wide variety of accounts of the nature of consciousness.  
And in these, very little common ground has been reached, and the 
problem remains.  Thus, as the present work attempts to reach to the 
core of the philosophy of mind, this chapter will serve as an attempt to 
establish sound conceptual and metaphysical foundations on which any 
subsequent philosophizing about the mind can be securely erected. 
The conceptual problems that lie at the heart of the philosophy of 
mind have particular force due to the fact that consciousness and its 
features (as they are typically conceived) resist the kinds of accounts that 
are produced by the physical sciences.  Given the way we typically think 
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about mental and physical phenomena (i.e., as fundamentally different), it 
is impossible to conceive of a “naturalized” account of the mind, 
according to which minds are understood to be a real part of the natural 
world.  It has become obvious that the way philosophers conceive of the 
mind and of the natural world has kept them from making real progress 
in the field.  John Searle has pointed out that problematic conceptions of 
the mind and of the natural world are really aspects of a larger, more 
general problem; what he calls the fundamental question of 
contemporary philosophy.  The question, for Searle, is this: 
 
How, if at all, can we reconcile a certain conception of the world as 
described by physics, chemistry, and the other basic sciences with 
what we know, or think we know, about ourselves as human beings?  
How is it possible in a universe consisting entirely of physical 
particles in fields of force that there can be such things as 
consciousness, intentionality, free will, language, society, ethics, 
aesthetics, and political obligations?1  
 
 The apparent inability to reconcile our conceptions of mental 
phenomena with our conceptions of the physical world is what creates 
the traditional mind-body problem.  It has been a continuing challenge to 
provide an account of consciousness and the world that does justice to 
what we know about each of them.  For instance, we know that mental 
                                       
1 J. R. Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (New York:  
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and physical phenomena interact in human action and perception, as we 
could not retain the concepts ‘action’ and ‘perception’, and therefore 
make sense of such features of our lives, without at least granting as 
much.  Thus, any theory that cannot make sense of these very real 
features of our lives cannot be considered an adequate account of 
conscious beings in the world.  In the philosophy of mind, then, one 
criterion of success is theoretical unification.  Providing a unified account 
of conscious beings in the world that can make sense of consciousness 
and its features, as well as the relations that exist between minds and the 
world, should be the primary motivation of the discipline.  It is the 
metaphysical assumptions that philosophers bring to problems in the 
philosophy of mind that have hindered their attempts to solve them.  
Moreover, in order to see the mistaken methodology at work, we should 
consider some of the more significant contributions to the historical 
development of our thinking about the mind.  By looking at these, we find 
clear examples within the history of the philosophy of mind where 
metaphysical presumptions produce untenable theories of consciousness. 
 
2.1 Traditional Approaches  
 
René Descartes, whose work brought the philosophy of mind into 
the modern philosophical world, confronted the problem of 
reconciliation.  For him, the problem of successfully reconciling a 
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conception of consciousness with what was known about the natural 
world appears insurmountable, precisely because he began his thinking 
about the problem with a particular conception of the nature of minds 
and bodies in place.  Descartes was committed to a conception of the 
mind as a purely thinking thing.  According to this conception, minds are 
composed of immaterial, spiritual, and thoroughly non-physical 
substance.  This sort of theory attempts to account for those features of 
minds that appear to be fundamentally different from the features of 
things that make up the physical world, and as a consequence of focusing 
on those differences, minds were thought to be theoretically isolatable 
from the physical world.    
This particular characterization of mental phenomena, according to 
which the way consciousness is understood is so fundamentally different 
from how the natural world is typically conceived, is the foundation of the 
assumption that the world must be made up of two very different kinds 
of things (i.e., Substance Dualism).  Moreover, Descartes is a conceptual 
dualist: due to his conception of the mind, he maintains that whatever is 
conceived as mental cannot be physical, and vice versa, because the 
mental and the physical represent mutually exclusive conceptual 
categories. 
Descartes’ proposed solution to the mind-body problem would, for 
better or for worse, have a lasting influence on modern theories of 
consciousness.  Cartesian Substance Dualism, as it has come to be 
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known, is Descartes’ attempt to reconcile his conception of the mind as 
an immaterial substance with his very different conception of the world as 
physical matter governed by physical laws.  Substance Dualism proposes 
that the world is made up of two utterly different kinds of things, each 
having utterly different kinds of properties.  On one hand, there are those 
things that comprise the physical world, namely, physical objects and 
events.  Physical things are characterized by their spatial extension, and 
are subject to basic physical laws.  On the other hand, there are those 
things that make up the world of mental phenomena: minds and their 
thoughts, etc.  Minds are essentially thinking things for Descartes, and 
therefore lack any physical properties.  Most importantly, despite these 
differences, Descartes insisted that mental and physical phenomena 
interact in human action and perception.  
It is important to recognize the value of Descartes’ contributions to 
the philosophy of mind.  We can see that his dualism appeared to be a 
theory that paid homage to our pre-theoretical conceptions of the mind 
and its features, and also of the natural world2.  It thus aimed to account 
for the features that we intuitively assume must be included in a plausible 
theory of minds, including interaction between mental and physical 
phenomena.  
                                       
2 Descartes’ conception of the natural world was in fact much different from modern 
scientific views for an important reason: his dualism, as well as his ideas about God, 
entail that he did not conceive of the natural world as causally closed.   
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However, the problems that render dualism untenable are rooted in 
the deeper metaphysical assumptions inherent in dualistic thinking.  
While dualistic conceptions of the world aim to account for everything 
that exists by postulating two utterly different kinds of things, the 
mistake lies in the methodology of beginning with a metaphysical belief 
about the nature of the phenomena in question.  A direct result of such a 
mistake is that we cannot make sense of how interaction between mental 
and physical phenomena could be possible at all.  
The problem with proposing two utterly distinct, mutually 
exclusive, metaphysical realms is that an account of their interaction is 
made impossible.  If, as Descartes imagined, the entities which occupy 
the mental world are utterly different from—that is, share no properties 
with—entities which occupy the physical world, then there is no 
conceivable way for the two kinds of entities to interact.  According to the 
basic principles of causation, if two objects share no properties, then 
there is no ground for causal interaction between them.  It is generally 
and uncontroversially accepted that, “causes and effects cannot be mere 
sets of correlated phenomena; they must share some common feature 
which provides a rationally accessible link between them.”3   
So the way Descartes conceived of the mind and the world (i.e., his 
commitment to Substance Dualism) made their interaction impossible.  
Though he offers a rough account of how such interaction is possible—it 
                                       
3 J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 92. 
 9 
is mediated by the pineal gland—philosophers tend to agree that 
“Descartes’ final position is to insist that God is responsible for these 
interactions.”4  Because of his commitment to interactionism, to claim 
that God must underwrite the interaction between the mental and the 
physical is really his only theoretical option.  However, this move has no 
explanatory value, and gets us no closer to a solution to the mind-body 
problem, as it amounts to saying that interaction happens, but we know 
not how.  
As a result, because Descartes’ dualism cannot account for the 
relationships between mental states and the physical world (those 
relationships required to account for action and perception) his account 
fails to explain what is a central aspect of our experience of being 
persons; namely, agency.  Perceptual and motor interaction with the 
world, including the mental states that mediate these processes, must be 
accounted for in our theories of mind, as this is one central feature of our 
existence.  
Property Dualism is a subsequent manifestation of dualism, and its 
proponents are also motivated by the desire to make sense of those 
features of mental phenomena that appear to be unaccounted for by the 
physical sciences.  The view postulates not two types of fundamental 
substance, but rather a world in which all substance is physical, although 
some (special) objects can have non-physical properties that are 
                                       
4 C. Eliasmith, (2006).  “Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind” [Online]. Available:  
http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/dualism.html 
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fundamentally different in kind than physical properties.  Although the 
world is conceived as comprised thoroughly of physical objects and 
events, property dualists argue that brains can have two utterly different 
kinds of properties.  Thus, Property Dualists typically assert that some 
brain events have both mental and physical properties.  Property Dualists 
also postulate irreducibly mental properties in order to make sense of 
certain mental phenomena that appear to be unaccounted for in terms of 
physical objects and properties5.  They too approach the philosophy of 
mind with a conception of the mental as irreducibly mental in order to 
soothe our intuitions about the unique nature of certain mental 
phenomena.   
Consider the position Frank Jackson formulates in his paper 
Epiphenomenal Qualia6.  Jackson advances what is known as the 
Knowledge Argument, where he concludes that even if one possessed all 
the physical information about a subject’s experience of the color red 
(e.g., the neural mechanisms involved, information about light waves, 
etc.), something is left out: information about the qualities of the 
experience of red itself.  He argues that, “there are certain features of the 
bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, 
                                       
5 For instance, the qualitative character of certain experiential states (labeled qualia) is 
typically thought to be irreducible to mere neurophysiological processes.  This is 
because no amount of empirical data can provide information about the ontologically 
first-person, qualitative features of our mental states. 
6 F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary 
Readings, edited by D. J. Chalmers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 273-280. 
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which no amount of physical information includes.”7  He assumes that if 
there is something that is not thoroughly physical—some exception in a 
world that can be thoroughly grasped by the physical sciences—it must 
be thoroughly mental (i.e., conceptual dualism).  The result is a clear 
instance of the Property Dualist’s position: although the world is 
understood as thoroughly physical, given that there are some phenomena 
that cannot be accounted for in terms of physical properties, there must 
exist an utterly different kind of property, properly understood as mental.  
Property Dualists think that by postulating mental properties they 
can claim that minds are brains, and hence are mostly accounted for by 
the physical sciences, yet with certain important exceptions such as 
qualia.  However, these exceptions come with a cost: we cannot make 
sense of how the mental and physical interact.  In order to make sense of 
mental phenomena, theorists often diminish their role in the physical 
world, specifically in action and perception8.  They are left with 
conceptual “danglers,”9 in the sense that mental phenomena are granted 
as thoroughly mental, yet an account of their relation to the physical 
world in action, and hence what work they do in the lives of persons, is 
unattainable on their own terms.  
                                       
7 Ibid., 273. 
8 This is precisely the epiphenomenalist’s position.  Epiphenomenalism is the view that 
mental states are completely inefficacious, and are only postulated in order to soothe 
our intuitions about the nature of mental phenomena. 
9 I am using this term as J. J. C. Smart does. See: J. J. C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain 
Processes," Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by D. J. 
Chalmers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 60-68.!
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Searle makes this point by arguing that “the problem with [Property 
Dualism] is that we do not see how to fit an account of these properties 
into our overall conception of the universe and how it works.”10  Jackson’s 
Epiphenomenalism, for instance, which is a result of his acceptance of the 
conceptual dualism of those he argued against, is a theory of the mind 
that explicitly denies qualia any causal role in action and perception11.  
Jackson believes that “the major factor in stopping people from admitting 
qualia is the belief that they would have to be given a causal role with 
respect to the physical world and especially the brain; and it is hard to do 
this without sounding like someone who believes in fairies.”12  That he 
sees the causal role of qualia in such a way represents his commitment to 
conceptual dualism, and hence his inability to formulate a theory of 
minds which can make sense of their interaction with the world.  Qualia 
are construed as causally inert in action.  These phenomena are 
understood as inefficacious “by-products” of neurobiological processes. 
So a version of the criticism of Substance Dualism also applies to 
Property Dualism: claiming that qualia are inefficacious with respect to 
the physical makes it impossible to make sense of how interaction, and 
hence theoretical unification, could be possible between the mental and 
the physical.  According to Epiphenomenalism, there is no causal 
relationship between one’s qualia and one’s actions—no one ever drank 
                                       
10 J.R. Searle, Mind: a Brief Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 45-
46. 
11 See Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia.  
12 Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia, 273. 
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because they were thirsty, or yelled because they were in pain—which is 
absurd.  Searle recognizes that “we really do not get out of the 
postulation of mental entities by calling them properties.  We are still 
postulating nonmaterial mental things.”13  The way theorists are 
committed to thinking about the mental and the physical as mutually 
exclusive categories still necessarily renders inconceivable their 
interaction even at the level of properties, as they are still postulated as 
utterly different in kind.  It is clear then that Jackson and the Property 
Dualists begin with the same conceptual commitments as Descartes (i.e., 
conceptual dualism), and as a result, their theories encounter the same 
difficulty: we cannot make sense of the interaction between the mental 
and the physical because it has been assumed that they are too different 
in kind to sustain interaction.   
And this is the crux of the problem with dualistic accounts in 
general: once the mental and the physical are rendered different enough 
to warrant two mutually exclusive categories, one can no longer make 
sense of how they work together in ways we know they must.  We cannot 
make sense of even the most basic aspects of our lives without assuming 
that minds are both causally efficacious and central to perceptual 
processes, and hence that minds interact with the physical world14.  If, as 
                                       
13 Searle, Mind, 46. 
14 See S.C. Coval and P.G. Campbell, A Critique of the Liberal Idea of a Person (New 
York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2010), 52-53.  For instance, Coval and Campbell offer a list of 
all the concepts that we must necessarily assume are real features of the lives of a 
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dualism assumes, interaction between the mental and the physical were 
impossible, then we could not act, and know that we had acted, nor could 
we even speak to raise such issues.  Such events presuppose interaction 
between the mental and the physical.  Therefore, because dualism, in any 
of its manifestations, cannot account for these basic features of our 
existence, it cannot be correct.  
And this is indeed the case.  Dualistic thinking, or conceptual 
dualism, in fact segregates the proposed metaphysical realms of the 
mental and the physical, and renders theoretical unification impossible.  
This is precisely because the two concepts are construed as mutually 
exclusive.  And as long as we are committed to this conception of the 
mental and the physical, we will not have a plausible theory of minds in 
the world.  Searle, whose criticisms of Dualism are central to his 
philosophy of mind, notes that “[Descartes’] terminology is designed 
around a false opposition between the ‘physical’ and the ‘mental.’”15  
Dualism, then, is not the right way to think about the mind.  It should be 
clear that dualistic philosophers begin with a particular metaphysical view 
about the nature of minds in hand, and end up with theories inherited 
from that metaphysics that are themselves untenable.   
 It has become obvious to most philosophers that dualism does not 
solve the mind-body problem, but rather perpetuates it.  As a result, 
                                                                                                                  
person.  They argue that a complete chronicle of the lives of persons must include at 
least an account of agency.  
15 J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
1992), 25. 
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most modern theories of mind advanced since Descartes have exhibited 
negative reactions to his philosophy, and can therefore be characterized 
as anti-dualist.  In turn, most anti-dualist positions, which purport to 
offer an alternative to dualistic thinking, espouse some form of substance 
and property Monism16.  So almost all modern anti-dualist positions17 are 
properly called ‘materialistic’ or ‘physicalistic’ theories of mind: the world 
is conceived as thoroughly physical.   
 ‘Physicalism’ refers to a broad set of metaphysical views that 
dominate most of the recent history of the discipline18.  The views are 
labeled ‘physicalist’ because, in every formulation, the central idea is that 
the world is made up of only one kind of stuff; namely, corporeal matter.  
Matter and the laws that govern it are believed to exhaustively account 
for everything that exists.  Thus, if minds and their features exist, 
Physicalism assumes that they must necessarily be strictly and narrowly 
physical in nature.  Given the prominence of anti-dualist theories of mind 
like Physicalism, it will be useful to evaluate the success of the general 
theoretical position by focusing on some of its specific historical 
manifestations. 
The history of Physicalism in the philosophy of mind can be 
characterized as the continued attempt to provide a physical account of 
                                       
16 This is the view that all of reality is of one kind. R. Audi, “Philosophy of Mind,” in 
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., 1999, 686. 
17 The exceptions are idealist theories that assume the world is thoroughly mental. 
18 I will use the term ‘Physicalism’ as opposed to the more traditional term 
‘Materialism,’ because the former is broader in scope, and typically applies to things not 
normally considered material (e.g., forces like electromagnetism, gravity, etc.). 
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mental phenomena.  Consequently, physicalist theories of mind come 
primarily in two variations: they are either reductive or eliminative.   
Reductive Physicalists grant the existence of certain phenomena 
that at least appear to be beyond the scope of the natural sciences.  
However, they do so on the grounds that a final analysis will reveal that 
we are mistaken about the real nature of these phenomena, and that they 
are really nothing more than physical phenomena.  In other words, it is 
assumed that any unique phenomenon is ontologically reducible to 
physical phenomena: the former is explicable in terms of the latter, 
without remainder.  These sorts of accounts reduce unique phenomena to 
their real physical nature, and thus establish descriptions of them that are 
in fact rooted in a thoroughly scientific understanding of the world.  J. J. 
C. Smart exhibits the Reductive Physicalist’s faith in science when he 
states, “that everything should be explicable in terms of physics, except 
the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable.”19 
Reductive Physicalism changes our conceptions of the nature of otherwise 
mysterious phenomena so that they are revealed to be thoroughly 
physical, and therefore compatible with Physicalism as a metaphysical 
presumption.  With regard to mental phenomena, Reductive Physicalists 
seek to reduce them to neurobiological processes in the brain and central 
nervous system.   
                                       
19 Smart, Sensations and Brain Processes, 61. 
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The Identity Theory, despite its various formulations, represents 
the Reductive Physicalist’s general view that minds are brains, and mental 
states are nothing more than brain states20.  Therefore, according to the 
Identity Theory, descriptions of mental phenomena are construed as 
merely different kinds of descriptions (perhaps illusory descriptions) of 
thoroughly neurobiological processes.   
U.T. Place, for example, argues that we must “treat two 
observations as observations of the same event in those cases where the 
technical scientific observations set in the context of the appropriate 
body of scientific theory provide an immediate explanation of the 
observation made by the man in the street.”21  What he means is that, 
according to this version of Physicalism, when a scientific description can 
be given of some phenomenon that we have come to describe intuitively 
based on our observations of that phenomenon, it is the scientific 
description that reveals and explains that phenomenon’s real nature.  
Because, for instance, the scientific description of lightning as a sudden 
discharge of energy in the atmosphere can explain our experiences of 
lightning flashes, it is inferred that the scientific description gets at the 
phenomenon’s true nature.   
                                       
20 See U.T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?,” Philosophy of Mind: Classical and 
Contemporary Readings, edited by D. J. Chalmers (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 55-59.  J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” Philosophy of Mind: 
Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by D. J. Chalmers (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 60-67. 
21 U.T. Place, Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, 58. 
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Moreover, it is argued that the same applies to the way we should 
understand mental phenomena: because neurobiological explanations 
can in principle account for why we have mental states, they reveal the 
true nature of those experiences.  According to the Identity Theory then, 
mental states, just like lightning, are mere appearances that distort our 
understanding of the real nature of the phenomena.  Thus, the relevant 
science can show us that mental states are states in the brain and central 
nervous system, whose true nature is exhaustively accounted for in terms 
of the physical (i.e., neurobiological) sciences.  Furthermore, as 
neuroscience developed exponentially over the last forty or so years due 
to advancements in neuro-imaging techniques, the search for 
neurophysiological descriptions that would reinforce such reductions 
seemed even more appealing as a method of accounting for the nature of 
mental phenomena.   
There are, however, problems with this position.  Most importantly, 
such reductions again leave out crucial aspects that must be included in 
the final description of the phenomena being explained.  Identity 
Theorists seek to reduce mental phenomena to events in the brain, 
without remainder.  However, there are remainders in such a reduction.  
Searle notes that physicalist theories are subject to the “absent qualia”22 
objection; the theories make no room for the qualitative aspects of 
conscious experience, which cannot be excluded from the final analysis.  
                                       
22 Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 53.  
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They cannot be excluded from the final analysis precisely because the 
qualia we experience are things we know about ourselves and, I argue, 
about our relations to the world we occupy.  So, for instance, by 
attempting to reduce a subjective experience of the color red to the 
neurological events that underlie the experience, we miss something 
crucial in the final analysis23: the qualitative features of the experience 
itself.   
At best, we can identify the physical correlates of a conscious state, 
or perhaps the causal mechanisms that are responsible for them.  Hence, 
another related problem with this version of Physicalism is the mistaken 
assumption that a causal explanation of mental phenomena provides an 
exhaustive metaphysical account of the mind.  We know that the brain is 
causally responsible for the existence of mental states, but this does not 
entail that mental states are nothing more that the neural mechanisms 
that create and sustain them.  Causal reductions attempt to show that 
some entity’s causal powers are entirely explainable in terms of the 
causal powers of another entity, whereas ontological reductions attempt 
to show that entities of a certain type consist entirely of (i.e., are really 
nothing but) entities of another type.  Causal reduction is not the same as 
ontological reduction, and therefore causal reductions do not entail 
ontological reductions. 
                                       
23 See Jackson’s Knowledge Argument.  We miss something even if we possess all the 
physical information about a subject’s color experience. 
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Reductive Physicalism provides us with a theory of the mind 
according to which irreducible features of mental phenomena—which are 
precisely what we are really trying to account for—are illicitly reduced to 
brain states.  This alone is enough to discredit Reductive Physicalism: a 
complete account of neurobiology does not provide us with a complete 
analysis of mental phenomena.  There are remainders in such a 
reduction, and they are undeniable features of our conscious lives.  And 
this theoretical shortcoming is a direct result of the physicalist’s 
metaphysical presumption that whatever exists must be strictly and 
narrowly physical. 
The shortcomings of Physicalism are even more apparent in its 
most exaggerated formulation, namely Eliminative Materialism24.  On this 
view also, anything that cannot be accounted for in principle by the 
natural sciences cannot exist at all.  But instead of accepting that the 
unique phenomena exist but are really something else (i.e., Reductive 
Physicalism), Eliminative Materialists deny that they exist altogether, 
precisely because they cannot be reduced.  So, for instance, an 
Eliminative Materialist will deny altogether that there is such a thing as 
the conscious experience of the color red.  We cannot ask the 
eliminativist what such an experience is like, because they claim that 
                                       
24 This view is attributed to Paul and Patricia Churchland. See: P.M. Churchland, 
“Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” Philosophy of Mind: Classical 
and Contemporary Readings, edited by D. J. Chalmers. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002: 568-580.  P.S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of 
the Mind/Brain (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1986). 
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there is in fact no experience the having of which is like anything (i.e., 
there is no such thing as a mental state, and therefore, no qualitative 
content).  On this view, any intuitions we may have about the nature of 
mental phenomena are false, and are considered instances of the 
outdated and inaccurate claims of “folk psychology”.25  In other words, 
eliminativists claim that accepting irreducible mental phenomena is the 
result of bad theorizing, and that advancements in neuroscience will 
continue to reinforce their own view that there are no such things26. 
It is clear that the phenomena we are trying to explain are simply 
being denied, as if these theorists can simply choose to eliminate familiar 
features of our mental lives from their final analysis because they evade 
scientific accounts.  Galen Strawson construes Eliminativism as a truly 
significant mistake in the history of philosophy:  
 
This is surely the strangest thing that has ever happened in the 
whole history of human thought…[and] it shows in a very pure 
                                       
25 This point was defended by Richard Rorty. See: R. Rorty, "Mind-body Identity, Privacy 
and Categories" in The Review of Metaphysics XIX: 24-54. Reprinted Rosenthal, D.M. 
(ed.) 1971. 
26 Even Patricia and Paul Churchland, who, along with Rorty, are seen as the most 
significant proponents of Eliminative Materialism, have backed off of the idea that we 
can eliminate “mental things” from our theories of mind. They claim that Eliminative 
Materialism was intended to be a prediction about the efficacy of neurobiological 
explanations.  However, such a prediction, namely, that neuroscientific descriptions 
would replace mental discourse is a retreat to the psycho-physical reduction of the 
Identity Theory.  See Patricia Churchland, interview by Julian Baggini, The Philosopher’s 
Magazine, Issue 57. Acumen Publishing Ltd., 2012. 
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way that the capacity of human minds to be gripped by theory, 
by faith, is truly unbounded.27   
 
On the same topic, Searle states that:  
 
One sees this pattern over and over.  A Materialist thesis is 
advanced.  But the thesis encounters difficulties; the difficulties 
take different forms, but they are always manifestations of an 
underlying deeper difficulty, namely, the thesis in question 
denies obvious facts that we know about our own minds.28 
 
This “underlying deeper difficulty”, despite being under the guise 
of anti-dualism, is in fact a result of the same sort of thinking that 
produces dualist theories.  Physicalist theories of mind, for the most part, 
implicitly endorse the central principle of Cartesian Dualism; namely, that 
the mental and the physical represent mutually exclusive metaphysical 
categories.  So even though physicalist theories of mind are characterized 
by their opposition to metaphysical dualism, the same conceptual 
dualism drives them: the ungrounded assumption that what is mental 
cannot be physical, and vice versa.  The difference with Physicalism is 
that its proponents are committed also to the view that nothing can exist 
that is not material or physical, so they have to either reduce mental 
                                       
27 G. Strawson, “Introduction’” in Real Materialism and Other Essays (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 6. 
28 Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 30. 
 23 
phenomena to physical phenomena or deny they exist, because of this 
prior metaphysical commitment in favor of Physicalism.  As a result, these 
forms of anti-dualism also fail to provide an adequate theory of minds in 
the world. 
We have now seen from a few historically significant examples how 
not to do philosophy of mind.  We have witnessed how assumptions 
about metaphysical categories have a history of producing inadequate 
theories of mind.  It is apparent that we need to take a fresh look at the 
problems involved in articulating the nature of consciousness, and in 
doing so, be clear about the way we initially conceptualize minds and the 
natural world so as to begin from a sound theoretical starting point, and 
not from a problematic metaphysical commitment.  And we should strive 
towards a conceptual foundation for working on the mind-body problem 
that not only avoids the conceptual dualism contained in both dualistic 
and anti-dualistic thinking, but that can help us start to actually establish 
real answers that can account for the very real phenomena that we 
confront as conscious beings in the world. 
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3. Naturalism 
 
The history of the philosophy of mind has repeatedly shown that 
the theories we end up with are a result of the way we begin to think 
about the mind and its place in the world.  The old conceptual categories 
have constrained our theories, and as such have produced untenable 
theories of mind.  But there is in fact a genuine methodological 
alternative to theories rooted in conceptual dualism, which avoids the 
traditional mistakes that have halted progress in the field.  The 
alternative, I believe, is Naturalism.   
Typically, Naturalism within the philosophy of mind proposes that 
whatever exists, from brains and nerves to consciousness and 
intentionality, is to be understood as a real part of the natural world, and 
that to be a real part of the natural world requires that a thing has a 
function in the world29.  Those who take a naturalistic approach to the 
philosophy of mind should deny any conceptual obstacle to this position, 
because it is a view that strives to be metaphysically neutral.  Naturalism, 
as I understand it, is generally not the kind of theory that begins with the 
self-imposed task of enumerating and describing the kinds of things that 
exist.  Most importantly, the greatest strength of a naturalistic approach 
to the philosophy of mind, properly understood, is that it can begin by 
accepting what we cannot deny about ourselves and about the world.  A 
                                       
29 Anything that we think exists but has no function in the world is truly a conceptual 
dangler. 
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Naturalist should recognize that whatever “kind” differences there are 
between mental phenomena and physical phenomena are not obstacles 
to their function, and that starting by categorizing the kinds of things 
that exist will obscure more than it will illuminate the nature of 
consciousness.  Furthermore, the inability of the natural sciences to 
account for mental phenomena has no force, as this shortcoming appears 
to be a result of the way we conceive of the scope of scientific inquiry30.  
Searle and Strawson are candid about defending a naturalistic 
approach towards the philosophy of mind.  Strawson writes: 
 
Full recognition of the reality of experience is the obligatory starting 
point for any remotely realistic version of physicalism because it’s the 
obligatory starting point for any remotely realistic theory of what 
there is.  It’s the obligatory starting point for any theory that can 
legitimately claim to be naturalistic because experience is itself the 
fundamental given natural fact.31  
 
This position represents a methodological shift away from the 
problematic conceptual commitments that have halted progress in the 
                                       
30 Physicalist theories of mind, like the Identity Theory, are guilty of “Scientism” in this 
regard.  This is the view that the scientific method is the ultimate authority on the 
nature of reality.  Those guilty of scientism maintain that the only things that exist are 
those that are knowable, in principle, strictly empirically (i.e., those things that are 
ontologically objective).  However, this necessarily implies denying that consciousness 
exists because, as consciousness is ontologically subjective, in the sense that it is only 
experienced by the person who is conscious, it evades a strictly empirical account. And 
denying consciousness cannot be done coherently.   
31 Strawson, Introduction, 7. 
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field.  Strawson’s point is important to the history of the philosophy of 
mind, because by urging that theories must begin with the acceptance of 
the undeniable existence of conscious experience32, his account is not 
constrained by a pre-established metaphysics.  Such a naturalistic 
approach implies a denial of conceptual dualism, and specifically of the 
idea that differences between mental and physical phenomena make their 
interaction unintelligible.  As Searle notes, “the poverty of these 
categories becomes apparent as soon as you start to think about the 
different kinds of things the world contains.”33  Conscious processes, 
which indeed are most likely caused by and realized in the central 
nervous system, can neither be construed as strictly and narrowly mental 
nor physical and so should not be conceptualized as such.  A naturalistic 
approach should urge, then, that philosophers theorize about minds and 
the world without the self-imposed constraints of such fixed categories, 
and instead produce accounts of consciousness that are compatible with 
the undeniable facts (e.g., that consciousness really exists).  For this 
reason, it appears that there are definitive advantages to having the 
naturalistic methodology driving our theories of mind.   
The term ‘Naturalism’ is apt for this alternative methodology, 
because it is an approach that begins with the acknowledgement of 
certain truths about our nature as persons.  One cannot escape one’s 
                                       
32 Note here how narrow Strawson’s theoretical starting point is (i.e., experience).  I 
argue that there is a much richer theoretical starting point that the Naturalist is entitled 
to. See Strawson, Introduction, 7. 
33 Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 25. 
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nature as a conscious being; it is confronted at every moment.  Human 
beings are the kinds of things that have conscious experience, and so any 
theory of mind that denies this will necessarily fail.  
Naturalism, as I have outlined it so far, obviously relies on the 
notion of “undeniability.”  For instance, Strawson, who claims conscious 
experience is undeniable, draws attention to the logical absurdity of 
philosophical theories of consciousness that deny that there is such a 
thing as consciousness at all, and labels this denial “the silliest view ever 
held by any human being.”34  The denial of consciousness is self-
contradictory: a denial itself entails the existence of consciousness 
because denial, like any action, presupposes consciousness.  A denial of 
consciousness presupposes consciousness because such an assertion 
implies the use of thought and language on the part of the denier.  So the 
denial of consciousness is self-refuting.  No argument for the existence 
of consciousness is needed; it is something we know about ourselves 
non-inferentially, and, moreover, any attempt to refute it confirms it.  To 
argue against this point in any way would be to miss the point entirely, as 
it would again necessarily imply thought and language on the part of the 
one making the argument.  Furthermore, this point exhibits the value of 
the Naturalist’s method.  By beginning with undeniable facts, one 
recognizes what must be the case in order to make sense of what one 
already knows about the world; one reaches philosophical bedrock.   
                                       
34 Strawson, Introduction, 8. 
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Thus, with Strawson’s version of Naturalism, a conception of the 
natural world emerges which is more commodious, more hospitable to 
“non-physical” phenomena, and thus which can account for what cannot 
be denied (e.g., experience).  By ‘experience’, Strawson is referring to 
conscious states, and those particular ontologically subjective features of 
conscious states that escape objective, third-person investigation.  His 
primary concern is qualia (i.e., the qualitative character of conscious 
experiences, such as the experience of the color red or the experience of 
the taste of bitter food).  Qualia are typically absent from physicalist 
theories of mind, precisely because they cannot be accounted for by the 
physical sciences, given that they exist only as experienced by a subject 
(i.e., they have an irreducibly first-person, subjective ontology35).  Thus, 
Strawson claims that he is a “realistic physicalist, a real physicalist, a 
realistic or real naturalist, and one can’t be one of those if one denies the 
existence of the entirely natural phenomena whose existence is more 
certain than the existence of anything else: experience.”36   
So the important point here is that Strawson’s Naturalism begins 
with a particular undeniable claim about minds and the world, and not 
with a theory-laden metaphysical view about the nature of minds and the 
world already in place.  We might say that the naturalistic philosophical 
                                       
35 Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 19. 
36 Ibid., 7. Note that this is actually quite Cartesian, i.e. he begins with his own 
conception of a thinking thing.  The Cartesian “I” and Strawson’s “experience” seem to 
play the same foundational role in each theory, and this should make us cautious of 
Strawson’s theoretical starting point, specifically his (solipsistic) epistemological claim 
that we can be more certain of experience than anything else.   
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method starts with claims like “it is a matter of fact that X”, where X 
stands for any phenomena the denial of which would be absurd.  And 
those things that cannot be denied must then be foundational in our 
theories of mind (i.e., we cannot describe our way out of them37, they are 
philosophical bedrock). 
Searle also defends a naturalistic theory of consciousness, and in 
doing so, he provides some detail to our understanding of the undeniable 
facts about consciousness that constitute the Naturalist’s starting point.  
His theory of consciousness, which he labels Biological Naturalism, is a 
refreshingly clear and concise account of what one must accept about the 
nature of consciousness in order to begin building a plausible theory of 
the mind.  Searle lays out four points that constitute the metaphysical 
core of his work: 
 
1. Conscious states, with their subjective, first-person ontology, 
are real phenomena in the real world.   
2. Conscious states are entirely caused by lower level 
neurobiological processes in the brain.   
3. Conscious states are realized in the brain as features of the 
brain system, and thus exist at a level higher than that of 
neurons and synapses.   
                                       
37 This is an expression used by Coval and Campbell.  It refers to certain metaphysical 
truths that we must acknowledge, and subsequently build theory upon. Whatever we 
cannot describe our way out of must be foundational in our thinking. See: Coval and 
Campbell, A Critique of the Liberal Idea of a Person, 82. 
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4. Because conscious states are real features of the real world, 
they function causally.38 
 
Searle’s Naturalism of the mind, therefore, explicitly endorses the 
premise that consciousness is a biological phenomenon.  He argues that 
“consciousness is a system-level, biological feature in much the same 
way that digestion, or growth, or the secretion of bile are system-level, 
biological features.”39  Thus, Searle’s account is reinforced by what we 
have learned empirically about the physical nature of the brain: it is a 
thoroughly physical organ that as a matter of fact produces 
consciousness.  The entire field of clinical neuropsychology is ripe with 
empirical evidence that maps the effects that physical changes to the 
brain have on one’s mental states40.  To deny this point would be bad 
philosophy, given what we already know about the world. 
The value of Searle’s Biological Naturalism is that it, like Strawson’s 
account, endorses an expanded notion of what sorts of things comprise 
the natural world, beyond the narrow conception of the physical.  And 
this increased theoretical acceptance is not arbitrary.  Searle argues that 
                                       
38 Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction, 113-114. 
39 Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction, 112. 
40 Numerous case studies have been thoroughly documented that map relationships 
between the brain and mental states of human subjects.  Physical changes to the brain, 
such as the result of trauma, exposure to toxic material, and even preventative surgeries 
like the severing of the corpus callosum to alleviate the symptoms of seisures, cause 
radical changes to the mental lives of the subjects who are documented.  This entire 
field must presuppose that the brain is causally connected to mental states.  See J. A. 
Ogden, Fractured Minds: A Case-Study Approach to Clinical Neuropsychology, 2nd ed., 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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“consciousness qua consciousness, qua mental, qua subjective, qua 
qualitative is physical, and physical because mental,” and that this was 
deemed an untenable position solely on the grounds of the “inadequacy 
of the traditional vocabulary.”41  His claim, although seemingly 
counterintuitive, is justifiable once we reject problematic metaphysical 
commitments like conceptual dualism.  He can proceed because he 
recognizes that he need not accept the old, limiting vocabulary used in 
the field which obscures the straightforward point that consciousness 
exists, and is a product of natural, biological processes.  A naturalistic 
account of consciousness is unavoidable. 
For Searle, Naturalism about consciousness entails that no matter 
how mysterious the phenomenon is, the world of the natural sciences 
includes consciousness, irrespective of whether science and scientists 
recognize it as a subject of scientific enquiry.  Consciousness, on this 
view, is compatible with what we know about the natural sciences, and 
especially neurobiology.  And the evidence suggests that this is exactly 
the case: what we know about consciousness is entirely compatible with 
what we know about the underlying biological, chemical, or physical 
nature of reality, if we deny the mutual exclusivity of the old dualistic 
categories.  Thus, a naturalistic approach denies that an understanding of 
the kinds of things that exist determines what in fact does exist, and 
whether they interact, etc. 
                                       
41 Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, 15. 
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Consequently, it should be stated that one of the greatest strengths 
of Naturalism, as it is generally understood, is that its proponents need 
not enter into debates that typically occupy philosophers of mind.  
Despite the fact that Naturalism seems obviously promising, philosophers 
have not been quick to endorse it.  Many philosophers who are interested 
in the nature of consciousness are still worried about the 
dualist/materialist debate as it is traditionally formulated.  Naturalism 
allows us to move beyond such a debate and begin to tackle the 
philosophically substantial task of articulating the nature of 
consciousness and its features. 
 
There is something crucial touched on in point (4) of Searle’s 
account that deserves much more attention.  Both Strawson and Searle 
argue that consciousness is undeniable, and so any theory of mind that 
makes it problematic or denies its existence is therefore inadequate.  I 
agree with their strategy, but consciousness is only a part of the picture, 
and thinking of consciousness in isolation represents a misunderstanding 
of what it is that we cannot describe our way out of.  Simply recognizing 
the existence of consciousness is how Descartes began, and his method 
was problematic precisely because it assumes that consciousness is 
isolatable from the work that it does in the world.  If one simply 
understands consciousness in isolation from what it does, one risks 
falling into solipsism, and the very problems a naturalistic methodology 
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promises to avoid.  But there is a richer conception of the undeniable 
facts about our nature that we are entitled to, and in failing to recognize 
this, Strawson’s “fundamental given natural fact” is inadequate as 
philosophically foundational. 
Consciousness is undeniably related to the world, through the 
relations that are necessary for action and perception.  Hence, these 
relations are truly the Naturalist’s theoretical starting point; true 
philosophical bedrock.  It must be the case, given what we already know 
about ourselves and the world, that thought cannot occur in isolation as 
Descartes proposed, but is in fact related to the world in complex ways.  
So, it is the complex interaction between consciousness and the world 
that characterizes the metaphysics of persons, and thus that 
philosophers of mind must accept as undeniable and foundational.  
Therefore, the Naturalistic method, as I present it, begins with a 
unified theory of minds in the world, and thus satisfies the desire to 
provide a single account of the world that can make sense of the 
presence and functions of consciousness.  What this means, however, is 
that a plausible naturalistic account of consciousness must make sense of 
the particular work that consciousness does in the world: namely, as 
central to agency.  Conscious states not only exist, they are fully 
integrated with the natural world, in the lives of persons.  So my version 
of Naturalism proceeds by acknowledging that theoretical unification is 
no longer problematic.  In fact, the materials of theoretical unification are 
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given to us, because once consciousness is properly understood, 
philosophers must recognize that it is undeniably the case that 
consciousness requires complex relations to the world (e.g., in action and 
perception).  Consciousness is one’s informational link to the world.  It 
allows an uptake of information from the world (e.g., in perception) and 
allows one to make changes in the world based on that information (e.g., 
in action).  We cannot begin to make sense of what we know about the 
world and about the persons who occupy it without granting that 
consciousness is fully integrated in these ways.  And so, agency—the 
complex relations between conscious beings and the world they occupy— 
is philosophical bedrock.   
 
However, providing an account of the mind which addresses full-
blown agency has been continually problematic as a result of certain 
philosophers’ commitments to conceptual dualism, and the subsequent 
failure to construct a unified theory of conscious beings in the world in 
which they act and perceive.  Are there other theories out there that apply 
a naturalistic method and consider agency foundational in the philosophy 
of mind?  I would like to evaluate a fairly new school of thought that 
purports to acknowledge the significance of agency relations in theories 
of mind: Situated Cognition research.   
The term ‘Situated Cognition’ refers to a collection of loosely 
related ideas that have emerged out of research in cognitive science, 
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artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of mind.  Like most expressions 
that attempt to label certain schools of philosophical thought, ‘Situated 
Cognition Research’ means different things to different theorists.  
However, that persons are fully integrated with the world via agency 
relations appears to be common to all interpretations of Situated 
Cognition (SC) research.  In order to see whether SC research helps or 
hinders the overall naturalistic project, it will be beneficial to understand 
the historical development from which SC emerged.  
The prevailing model of cognitive and conscious processes that 
drove research in such areas as cognitive science, neuropsychology, and 
the philosophy of mind before the emergence of SC research has been 
labelled by some as “cognitivism.”42  Cognitivism, in the context of the 
philosophy of mind, construes mental processes primarily as formal, 
rule-based operations performed over abstract symbolic representations.  
This (traditional) view “maintains that cognition can be understood by 
focusing primarily on an organism’s internal cognitive processes (that is, 
specifically those involving computation and representation).”43  So, for 
instance, problem solving on this model is understood as a “purely” 
cognitive affair: linear input and output, mediated by symbolic 
                                       
42 M.L. Anderson, “Embodied Cognition: A Field Guide,” Artificial Intelligence, 149 
(2003), 93.  Cognitivism is rooted in conceptual dualism, as it was Descartes’ philosophy 
that emphasized the “thinking” aspect of the human being.  Descartes assumed that the 
mind could in principle exist without any external world at all, as minds are “purely” 
thinking things.  This is not only wrong, I argue that it is incoherent.   
43 M. Cowart, (2004).  “Embodied Cognition,” In The Internet Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy [Online]. Available: http://www.iep.utm.edu/embodcog/. Section 1. 
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representations that enable an agent to devise a solution to a given task 
by means of computational processes alone. 
 Cognitivism, then, exhibits an isolationist approach to the 
philosophy of mind.  Those who accept Cognitivism emphasize the 
internal, syntactical elements of cognition, and thus attempt to explain 
cognition and consciousness in isolation from particular facts about the 
world.  The influence of conceptual dualism is at work here: the mind is 
understood as utterly different from the world, and hence can be 
analyzed as such.  On this view, contributions made by the actions and 
perceptual experiences of an agent are deemed insignificant to 
understanding the nature of the mind, and the fact that agents are fully 
integrated in the world is not appreciated.  
The idea that we can explain mental processes without an account 
of the complex relations between agents and the world they occupy is 
exactly what SC theorists, and naturalism in general, take issue with.  It 
should be uncontroversial to accept some version of an input/output 
model of perception and action (given what we know about the 
physiology of perceptual and motor processes), and the existence of 
abstract symbolic representations and the formal computational rules 
that govern them are essential to our mental lives.  However, those who 
endorse the SC program claim that to attempt to understand cognitive 
and conscious processes in isolation from the world is to miss something 
crucial.   
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Consequently, SC research recognizes that agency relations are 
necessary for any mental processes at all, and so any theory that ignores 
this fails to truly grasp the nature of the mind.  Perceptual and motor 
interaction with the world cannot occur without accepting the full 
integration of agency, and symbolic representation and manipulation 
cannot aid in these processes unless we assume those symbols are not 
semantically-neutral, but represent real things in the world.  With SC, the 
complex relations between agents and the world they inhabit are 
acknowledged as central to plausible theories of mind.  So SC exhibits 
another attempt to shift away from conceptual dualism.  In general, we 
can say that, contrary to the cognitivist position, SC research favours a 
“relational analysis that views the organism, the action it performs, and 
the environment in which it performs it as inextricably linked.”44 
However, the way philosophers have interpreted the principles of 
SC has obscured its real import.  In most cases, they have missed the real 
significance of the ideas that are central to the SC approach, because 
those who claim to endorse SC research are not clear about the nature of 
the relations that characterize a situated agent.  For example, the 
Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) is one strong interpretation of the central 
                                       
44 Cowart, Embodied Cognition, Section 1.  Drawing on dynamic systems theory, SC 
theorists understand the human being as a complex system, whose “cognitive processes 
are not strictly attributable (reducible) to neurological mechanisms, nor are they purely 
conceptual” but are instead best understood as part of a dynamic process which involves 
the complex interaction of “cultural, social, biological and physical environment 
systems.” W. J. Clancy, “Scientific Antecedents of Situated Cognition’” in The Cambridge 
Handbook of Situated Cognition, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 28.  
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claims of SC research.  This is a view endorsed by David Chalmers, Andy 
Clark, and others45.  Essentially, the EMT is an attack on the 
internal/external distinction with regard to mental processes.  The EMT 
argues that because of the functional role that objects in the world can 
play in cognitive processes (e.g., a calculator), we should say that 
cognitive processes literally extend to include these objects and their 
processes, and therefore the world.  The idea is that truly understanding 
the situatedness of cognitive states renders the claim that cognitive 
processes are a thoroughly internal matter simply arbitrary. 
The EMT is problematic.  The idea that the mind itself extends into 
the world, and the world into the mind, depends upon SC’s claim about 
the “causal coupling” of internal cognitive states and external cognitive 
tools.  This is closely related to functionalist theories of mind46, as the 
central claim is that because a certain step in a cognitive process can also 
be performed by something external to the agent, we are wrong to 
assume that the mind is merely an internal process, but should rather 
assert that it includes anything that might fill a specific functional role in 
that cognitive task.  In the most common examples used to defend the 
EMT, theorists attempt to show that cognitive processes that recruit 
                                       
45 See A. Clark and D. Chalmers “The Extended Mind”, Analysis 58.1, January 1998, pp. 
7-19.  R. A. Wilson and A. Clark “How to Situate Cognition: Letting Nature Take Its 
Course”, in The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 55-77. 
46 Functionalist theories of mind seek to explain mental phenomena solely in terms of 
their functional role, and thus they assume that anything that can perform the function 
of a mental state can in principal be said to be a part of mental processes.  
 40 
objects in the world are in all relevant ways similar to cognitive processes 
that do not recruit such external cognitive aids.  Using a notebook to 
augment one’s memory, it is argued, involves a cognitive process that is 
functionally identical to biological memory, with the only difference being 
the spatial location where the cognitive process takes place47.  
Furthermore, not only do cognitive processes extend beyond the head 
into the world, but by implication consciousness itself, according to the 
EMT, is at least partially constituted by the external world (i.e., external 
cognitive aids are part of the mind of the subject that uses them).  
However, as Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa argue, Chalmers and Clark 
fail to recognize that there are in fact (obvious) important differences 
between biological memory and the use of a notebook, and consequently, 
between our “internal” and “external” worlds48.  They argue that the EMT 
theorist fails to identify what it is that makes something a cognitive or 
conscious state (i.e., the mark of the cognitive/conscious49), and so 
unsurprisingly has misplaced the boundaries of the mind.  For instance, it 
is a matter of contingent empirical fact that cognition involves certain 
distinct kinds of causal processes50.  More importantly, Adams and 
                                       
47 Clark and Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” 12. 
48 F. Adams, and K. Aizawa, “The Bounds of Cognition,” Philosophical Psychology, 14 
(2001), 43-64.  
49 In the present context these are not distinguished, but it seems uncontroversial to 
assume that the cognitive is one part of the conscious, which includes other kinds of 
states. For instance, pains are conscious but not cognitive. 
50 They are referring here to the causal (e.g. neurobiological) processes that underlie 
cognition, and how they differ from the causal process which underlie, for instance, the 
use of a notebook (i.e. elementary motor/mechanical processes). 
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Aizawa point out that cognitive or conscious states are marked by their 
possession of non-derived (or intrinsic) content51.  In other words, it is 
the mind alone that can have semantic content, precisely because the 
content of a mental state “means” something to the agent who has it.  
Only where there is consciousness is there cognitive content, as well as 
the ability to symbolize, operate on, and act on that content.  Because we 
cannot reasonably ascribe intrinsic content to anything external to minds 
(only minds can symbolize and assign meaning to those symbols), the 
EMT is clearly mistaken.  Moreover, Jesse Prinz contributes to this 
rejection of the EMT by arguing that the neuropsychological task of 
identifying the neural correlates of consciousness has been quite 
successful (e.g., mapping neuroanatomical relationships to conscious 
experience through neuropsychological experimentation), and there is no 
reason to assume that we would find such correlates outside the brain52.   
 It seems that proponents of the EMT are also motivated by the 
desire to theoretically unify their conception of the world with the 
existence of consciousness.  It is clear that there is some relation 
between internal mental processes, and objects and events that they are 
about.  However, the EMT distorts the real value of this point.  Their 
grounds are insufficient for extending the boundaries of the mind.   
                                       
51 We need to be clear here about the distinction between content (i.e., semantic, 
interpreted by or meaningful to an agent) and symbolized content (i.e., syntactical, 
uninterpreted symbols). 
52 J. Prinz, “Is Consciousness Embodied? In The Cambridge Handbook of Situated 
Cognition, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 419-436. 
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Identifying complex causal relationships between those things that are 
internal and external to the agent, and which together can contribute to 
the completion of some cognitive tasks, does not warrant the constitution 
claim that the EMT makes53.  That cognition may be causally dependent 
on the external world (i.e., requires the external world to provide content 
for thinking) does not imply that cognition is constitutively dependent on 
the external world (i.e., those external objects necessarily make up part 
of the mind).  By analogy, that a group of elected officials is causally 
responsible for drafting a policy does not imply that that group of 
individuals is somehow a constitutive part of that policy, or that billiard 
ball A causes billiard ball B to move does not imply that billiard ball A is 
somehow a part of billiard ball B; this is absurd. Thus, the EMT is one 
failed interpretation of the general principles of SC research, as SC clearly 
does not have the consequences that the EMT theorists think it does. 
 I suggest that it is best to interpret SC research as an extension of 
the Naturalist’s project, which brings agency and causation to the 
foreground of the philosophy of mind.  Situated Cognition reminds us of 
the complex relationships that as a matter of fact exist between the 
actions, perceptions, and conscious states of an agent, and the world 
they occupy.  It reminds us that interaction with the world is crucial for 
one’s mental life; it is one of the undeniable features of consciousness 
that form the foundation of the Naturalist’s account.  Agency and its 
                                       
53 Adams and Aizawa, The Bounds of Cognition, 56. 
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family of relations, and not an isolatable Cartesian mind, becomes the 
theoretical starting point for our attempts to understand the mind.  
Moreover, the best way to understand agency relations is by recognizing 
the central role that causation plays in the natural world54.  Causation is 
central to a proper understanding of SC, and certainly of Naturalism.  
Causation is the natural relation of change.  So one role of SC research is 
to remind us that when attempting to get at the nature of the mind, we 
must look to the complex causal relations that as a matter of fact exist 
between the mental states of an agent and the world that agent occupies.   
There is another insight that follows when we understand the 
principles of SC as an extension of Naturalism.  SC research provides us 
with a better understanding, for lack of a better expression, of exactly 
what consciousness is for.  On the old model (i.e., conceptual dualism, 
Cognitivism and isolationism), consciousness appears to function in the 
service of abstract representation and computation alone.  There is no 
doubt that conscious states are capable of such tasks.  However, there is 
a further purpose for engaging in these, as in any, conscious tasks: 
consciousness’ primary function is to facilitate an agent’s interaction with 
the world.  SC research, and the greater naturalistic method, suggests 
that thinking is in the service of doing; we would not be able to perceive 
or act at all without conscious states, and we would not need conscious 
                                       
54 It is important to note that causation has been a problematic notion in the history of 
philosophy (e.g. Hume).  However, most skepticism about causation is a result of 
theories of mind that already assume minds to be isolated from the world, and therefore 
that observing apparent causal relations tells us nothing about the world.   
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states if we did not need to perceive and act in the world around us.  One 
of the additional bits of evidence that supports this claim is that, as a 
matter of fact, agents typically optimize the amount of conscious 
deliberation needed in order to accomplish a given task55.  The ability to 
symbolize, conceptualize, and use language to represent the world all 
serve to make agents more successful in their interactions with the world.   
Thus, a naturalistic approach should trust persons’ abilities to 
know (or come to know) the world as it really exists.  As Coval and 
Campbell argue, “persons and the objectivity that houses them are 
internally related: the person is a gatherer of information of, and actor in, 
the world, and the world is that objectivity that may inform us and be 
acted within.”56  Naturalism honors this crucial link to objectivity that 
makes agents what they are. 
So mental phenomena are fully integrated in, fully interactive with, 
the world.  Therefore, on one hand, we cannot make sense of the 
Cartesian isolated mind, because there can be no mental content without 
such interaction, and we cannot make sense of a “contentless” mind.  
Conscious agents are always causally situated in the world, and mental 
phenomena cannot be understood in isolation from their source of 
content: the world.  On the other hand, we cannot make sense of the 
world, as we know it (e.g., complete with agency), without presupposing 
                                       
55 At least, effective agents do.  See Rodney Brooks’s Herbert in: Anderson, Embodied 
Cognition: A Field Guide, 96. 
56 Coval and Campbell, A Critique of the Liberal Idea of a Person, 2. 
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the presence of consciousness, because agency is not possible without 
consciousness.  Thinking and doing are necessarily linked.  Chalmers’ 
“philosophical zombie”57 is also incoherent then.  Derived from a thought 
experiment, the philosophical zombie purports to establish the possibility 
of a world exactly like ours (i.e., complete with agency) where 
consciousness does not exist.  However, because agency necessarily 
requires conscious states, this is not a genuine philosophical possibility. 
The fully interactive nature of minds and the world is philosophical 
bedrock. 
Consequently, what information we are capable of having will be 
one limiting factor in what perceptions and actions we are capable of.  
Agents like humans, who rely heavily on visual information in their 
interaction with the world, have visually rich conscious experiences58.  
The abstract symbolization and computation which humans are capable 
of allows us to accomplish the more complex, abstract tasks we engage 
in (e.g., tracking the stock market).  For agents like bats that use echo-
location, it would only make sense that their conscious experience, the 
information they are capable of possessing, would make that particular 
kind of behaviour most effective.  Once we realize this point, we can see 
how possessing consciousness is a huge evolutionary advantage.  At least 
                                       
57 See: D. Chalmers, “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature,” Philosophy of Mind: 
Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by D. J. Chalmers (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 249. 
58 Many philosophers focus on visual-perceptual states as paradigm examples of 
human conscious states. 
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in our own case, the evolutionary advantage of our specific type of 
conscious experience is enormous.  Without the simplest conscious states 
we could not engage in action or perceive the world in any way, and so 
clearly the chances of survival would be slim.  With the ability to 
symbolize and manipulate information, or articulate systemic rules for 
logic, for instance, comes a greater capability for action, understanding, 
communication, and so on.  
 
So Naturalism, as I have presented it, has provided a clear 
conceptual foundation on which to begin making real progress on 
specific problems in the philosophy of mind.  In summary, a naturalistic 
approach, as I have presented it, makes philosophical problems 
concerning the nature of consciousness “manageable” again.  The 
problems are manageable because the naturalistic method recognizes the 
undeniable existence and full integration of mental phenomena, complete 
with all the information we know agents to possess, instead of beginning 
with commitments to metaphysical beliefs that would thwart such 
integration (e.g., conceptual dualism).  
Furthermore, what is really significant about Situated Cognition 
research, understood as an extension of Naturalism, is that it reminds us 
that there is something crucial about the causal relations between agents 
and the world (i.e., an agent’s source of information).  SC recognizes that 
consciousness is informationally connected to the world and so one 
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cannot give an account of consciousness apart from those connections.  
Consciousness is always situated (causally and informationally) in the 
world, it functions to facilitate an agent’s perceptual-motor interactions 
with the world, and thus what information an agent has will be, in part, a 
matter of its nature.  The theoretical starting point, then, is the existence 
of consciousness and its internal relations59, as these are undeniable 
features of our lives as agents. 
 The background that we will work against has been erected.  The 
next step in the larger project of articulating the nature of consciousness, 
then, should be to begin to analyze in more detail some of these complex 
relations between minds and the world that are central to consciousness.  
Among the informational relations of consciousness is intentionality, a 
subject of considerable interest in the philosophy of mind. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
59 “One says that a bears an internal relation, R, to b provided a’s standing in R to b is 
an essential property of a…a thing’s essential properties will seem to include certain of 
its relations to other things.” R. Audi, “Relation,” in Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 
2nd ed., 1999, 789. 
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4. Intentionality 
 
4.1 Recent History  
 
Intentionality is among the most philosophically significant 
relations between minds and the world.  The relation of intentionality is 
the property that some things have in virtue of their being about 
something else.  A paradigm example of an intentional state is a thought 
being about some object or event in the world.  Providing an account of 
intentionality has been a problem in the philosophy of mind (as with the 
other relations of consciousness) because it necessarily involves 
interaction between mental states and the world, which is a familiar 
problem, specifically for those who endorse (explicitly or implicitly) 
substance or property dualism.  Moreover, because it appears that no 
ordinary material objects have intrinsic intentionality, accounting for it is 
a serious problem for physicalist philosophers of mind, who would seek 
to reduce mental states to brain states, or eliminate such a phenomenon 
from their account of the kinds of things that exist.  However, because an 
account of consciousness must include an account of its various relations 
to the world, and intentionality is one of these relations, then having a 
clear account of the relation of intentionality will be a necessary 
component of any complete account of consciousness.  There are specific 
issues that are presently thought to be most important in the conceptual 
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analysis of intentionality.  Michelle Montague, in “Recent Work on 
Intentionality,” provides a detailed map of the relevant contemporary 
conceptual landscape.   
It is necessary, first, to approach the specific problem of providing 
an account of intentionality with our naturalistic methodology in mind.  
We must make the preliminary naturalistic move, and start by 
acknowledging what must be true given what we already know about 
ourselves and about the world.   
As Montague points out, William Lyons characterizes naturalization, 
in the task of providing an account of intentionality, as the attempt to 
“give an up-to-date and ‘tough-minded’ account which [theorists] feel is 
consonant with the findings in the relevant sciences that deal with the 
mind.”60  However, there are obviously many contentious notions in such 
a claim, and such obscurity does not tell us how to proceed.  For many 
theorists, naturalization means retreating once again (perhaps 
unintentionally) into conceptual dualism, and thus defending a reductive 
or eliminative materialism, when Naturalism is mistakenly understood as 
a reiteration of Physicalism.  For others, it is assumed that naturalization 
implies that intentionality is far more ubiquitous than we have 
traditionally assumed, and it is ascribed to all sorts of phenomena.  As 
Montague notes, for instance, “philosophers pointed to the example of 
tree rings tracking the age of trees (an entirely non-mental phenomenon) 
                                       
60 Montague, Recent Work on Intentionality, 765. 
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to ground the sense in which intentionality could be a natural relation.”61  
I argue that a naturalistic account of intentionality does not have any of 
these implications. 
In regard to the project of naturalizing intentionality, namely 
providing an account of intentionality that is consistent with Naturalism 
as I understand it, I endorse Searle’s position:  
 
By naturalizing intentionality [philosophers] usually mean 
denying that it really exists, or asserting that it is really 
something else.  My answer to this is that intentionality really 
does exist and is not something else.  Intentionality is already 
naturalized because, for example, thinking is as natural as 
digesting.62   
 
So, as I understand it, a naturalistic account of intentionality begins 
with the recognition of the fact that intentionality is a real, and central, 
feature of our conscious lives.  Again, the advantage is that an account of 
the phenomenon becomes possible when we recognize the undeniability 
of the phenomenon, and do not allow prior metaphysical constraints to 
create a problem in the first place.  Intentionality, like all mental 
phenomena, is caused entirely by, and is realized in, the brain, yet cannot 
                                       
61 Montague, Recent Work On Intentionality, 765. 
62 Searle, John. Making the Social World.  Page 42-43. 
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be accounted for exhaustively in terms of neurobiological processes63 
(i.e., something is left out of such an account).  But regardless, 
intentionality must be a real part of the world, as we once again cannot 
make sense of our lives (e.g., our agency), and so cannot have an 
accurate theory of minds in the world, without at least granting that some 
of our mental states are about objects and events in the world we occupy.  
If we deny that intentionality is a real phenomenon—that is, if we take 
Naturalism as a reiteration of Physicalism—then we would have to 
abandon most of the concepts we effectively apply, including those 
relevant to action and perception (e.g., we could not make sense of our 
perceptual experiences, including our perceptions of our own actions, if 
they were not understood to be about things in the world). 
 Given my interpretation of the Naturalist’s method, we can begin to 
truly understand the conceptual details of the phenomenon of 
intentionality.  To do so, one must recognize that the substantive debates 
about intentionality revolve around two sets of issues.  These issues 
concern, on one hand, what genuine intentionality is (what intentional 
content is and how it is related to other mental phenomena and the 
world) as opposed to derived intentionality, and, on the other hand, what 
sorts of things are capable of having intentionality.  These issues are 
related, and in order to get clear on what kinds of things can have 
intentionality, one needs to first articulate in greater detail what 
                                       
63 Searle calls consciousness a system level feature of the brain. Searle, Mind: A Brief 
Introduction, 115. 
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intentional content is, and how it is to be understood in comparison to 
other related mental phenomena. 
 Montague notes that in the recent history of the attempt to say just 
what intentionality amounts to in some detail, a number of accounts have 
been put forth by philosophers which highlight some of the different 
views on crucial concepts surrounding intentionality.  I summarize the 
relevant points as follows: 
 
1. Intentional content is distinguishable and therefore theoretically 
isolatable from other kinds of mental content (specifically 
something called phenomenal content64).  
 
2. There are various kinds of mental content, and among them are 
intentional and phenomenal content, which are intimately and 
inextricably linked.   
 
2a. (2) is true, and moreover, all phenomenal content is sensory. 
 
                                       
64 The historical treatment of intentionality, especially in the rejection of Continental 
thinkers like Husserl and Brentano, led contemporary analytic philosophers of 
consciousness to argue that intentional content is easily distinguishable from what was 
known as phenomenal content, and that either kind of content can and does exist 
without the other.   
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2b. (2) is true, and there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenal 
content as well as sensory phenomenal content, and it plays a central 
role in intentionality. 
 
Once we can say what it is about mental states by virtue of which 
they have intentionality, an explanation which will depend upon an 
understanding of intentional content, an account of what kinds of things 
can have intentionality emerges.  
  Given that intentionality is the property of aboutness, then 
intentional content has to be something like the determinate content of 
certain conscious states; the content that determines what a particular 
conscious state is about.  So, if my thought is about that apple, then my 
thought has intentionality, and the content of that mental state is what 
makes it a thought about that apple and not something else or nothing at 
all.  These general remarks seem compatible with most, if not all, existing 
accounts of intentionality.  
 Now, how might intentional content be related to what we call 
phenomenal content, if at all?  What is phenomenal content, and is it 
crucial to understanding intentionality?  When phenomenal content is 
discussed in the literature, it is generally agreed to be something like the 
total content of one’s subjective conscious states at any given moment.  
Any and all experiential content (e.g., perceptual content, qualitative 
content) is typically believed to be included in a subject’s phenomenal 
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content.  Phenomenology, for instance, is a school of philosophy whose 
proponents believe the central task of philosophy is the subjective 
analysis of the totality of experience.  So while my thought may be about 
that apple, the totality of my conscious states at the time that thought 
occurs amounts to more than that.  Included in the overall phenomenal 
experience for beings like me are things like perceptions of the table the 
apple is on, the room the table is in and all the other objects that occupy 
it, memories, background beliefs, perhaps even my own thoughts65, as 
well as the qualitative features of my experiences.   
I argue that there is necessarily an important relation between 
intentional content and phenomenal content.  One way to describe this 
relation is to say that intentional content will always be a part of the 
phenomenal content of a subject (i.e., a part-whole relation).  The ability 
to possess phenomenal content at all (i.e., to have, and store information 
about, experiences of the world) must be a prerequisite for having 
thoughts that are about particular objects and events in the world.  If 
intentional content is some determinate part of the totality of one’s 
phenomenal content, then phenomenal content must be required for 
there to be any intentional content at all.  In other words, one cannot 
have intentional content without phenomenal content precisely because it 
is this totality of one’s conscious states that provides the possibility of 
                                       
65 Siewert, Pitt, Strawson, and I all endorse some version of the view that there is such a 
thing as cognitive phenomenal content.  We will see the role of this notion when we 
discuss the details of Strawson’s account of intentionality, which contributes to the 
foundations of my account.  See Montague, Recent Work on Intentionality. 
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having any intentional content at all.  All of this follows, I believe, from 
these definitions of intentional and phenomenal content. 
 We can now say at least something about what kinds of things are 
capable of intentionality.  Given that intentionality and phenomenal 
content are intimately related in the sense that intentional content can 
only occur where there is phenomenal content (i.e., intentional content is 
a determinate part of the phenomenal content of a subject), it follows 
that intentionality can only exist in objects capable of phenomenal 
content.   
If this is the case, the externalist theories of intentional content 
(such as the EMT, or the tree-ring ascription theory) are untenable.  Both 
schools of thought claim that there are no important differences between 
the kind of aboutness that my intentional states have, and the kind of 
aboutness found in words written in a notebook, or in the rings of a tree.  
However, those who defend such claims have failed to recognize that the 
notebook that aids in memory tasks or the rings of the tree are not 
intrinsically intentional.  This kind of content can only exist in a 
conscious subject, because only a conscious subject with phenomenal 
content can have experiences at all, and, moreover, only then is the 
content intrinsic (i.e., symbolizable, meaningful to, or interpreted by, the 
subject).  Thus, if there is no phenomenal content, there can be no 
intentional content. 
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4.2 Strawson’s Theory of Intentionality 
 
Galen Strawson develops an account of intentionality according to 
which intentional content can be a feature of occurrent, conscious, 
experiential states only66.  This follows from the previous claim (which 
Strawson and I endorse) that intentional content requires phenomenal 
content, because only occurrent conscious states have phenomenal 
content, according to our definition of phenomenal content.   
It is clear that a persistent general objection to naturalistic theories 
of intentionality is that such theories might be interpreted in such a way 
as to allow for the ascription of genuine intentionality to all sorts of 
things.  Thus, the Naturalist should continue to defend the general claim 
that intentionality is only a feature of occurrent conscious states against 
those interpretations that ascribe intentionality to anything other than 
occurrent conscious states, such as the dispositional states (e.g., 
unconscious beliefs) of entities capable of conscious experience, and 
even entities that are not at all capable of conscious experience.  If the 
criteria for genuine intentionality are too broad, Strawson argues, then we 
confront a problem of ubiquity.  The idea that it might be possible to 
ascribe intentionality to everything distorts our understanding of the real 
nature of intentionality; a phenomenon that seems obviously and crucially 
related to conscious experience.  
                                       
66 G. Strawson, “Intentionality and Experience” in Real Materialism and Other Essays 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 259. 
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 The first sort of ascription of intentionality beyond occurrent 
conscious states that we should evaluate is the ascription of intentionality 
to dispositional states, such as the beliefs one has that are not presently 
conscious67.  However, if intentionality requires phenomenal content, and 
phenomenal content is the totality of one’s conscious experiences (or 
conscious states), then merely dispositional non-occurrent states could 
not be intentional.  Strawson points out that even though this is contrary 
to some current theories, it is really an elementary metaphysical point 
that a disposition is not intentional68.  This follows if we are truly 
speaking of these as dispositional states (i.e., brain states that are 
potentially conscious under certain conditions).  A disposition, by its very 
nature, is only potentially contentful (i.e., if it becomes actual or 
occurrent).  If, at time t, a state is not actually conscious, it is not, at time 
t, actually about anything.  
Another sort of ascription of intentionality beyond occurrent 
conscious states, the sort that leads to ubiquity claims, namely further 
ascriptions of genuine intentionality beyond experiential conscious states 
to experience-less entities, is by way of the identification of what seem to 
                                       
67 Searle, Making the Social World, 26.  Searle takes it as obvious that the belief that 
George Washington was the first U.S. president has genuine intentionality when not 
presently conscious, presumably because there is some sense in which information 
about the world is stored in memory.   
68 G. Strawson, “Real Intentionality 3: Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness”, in Real 
Materialism and Other Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 282. 
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be certain other “aboutness” relations69.  It appears that the presence of 
such “aboutness” relations might warrant the ascription of intentionality 
to the experience-less entities that have them.  In fact, some might go so 
far as to argue that all items related causally have intentionality, because 
“effects carry information about their causes.”70  The idea is that 
intentionality must exist wherever there is causation, because if 
information is intentional, and causation is informational in the sense 
that effects carry information about their causes, then the relata of 
causation must be intentional.  Moreover, if this is the case— 
that every relata of causation is intentional—then genuine intentionality is 
ubiquitous because causation is. 
 Strawson disagrees, however, and argues instead that there must 
be at least two kinds of aboutness: the kind that is a feature of conscious 
states and the kind that is a feature of causal relations.  Aboutness, then, 
would be ubiquitous on this view71—a real feature of all items related 
causally—but this ubiquity is not threatening to our account of 
intentionality, because it is not the kind of aboutness that is a feature of 
conscious states72.  Intentionality, again, involves a different kind of 
                                       
69 “A puddle, for example, may reflect San Vitale, and in that sense genuinely contain or 
constitute a representation of San Vitale, and representation entails aboutness, which is 
in this case wholly underived.”  Strawson, Real Intentionality 3, 284. 
70 Strawson, Real Intentionality 3, 286.  Strawson does not name any philosophers who 
endorse this position, but nevertheless construes it as a real theoretical possibility.  
71 Strawson speaks of “underived non-experiential aboutness” (Real Intentionality 3, 
284) and maintains that “UNA falls infinitely short of any kind of genuine intentionality 
and that UNA is utterly ubiquitous.” (Real Intentionality 3, 290). 
72 This would be “aboutness” without “intentionality.”   
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aboutness73, which is a feature of experiential states alone.  So for 
Strawson, intentionality entails aboutness, but aboutness does not entail 
intentionality.  
 Now, what might motivate Strawson to make this move?  Why might 
he feel the need to multiply kinds of aboutness?  Again, philosophers 
concerned with the metaphysics of the mind are often motivated by the 
need to provide a unified account of minds in the world.  To claim that 
intentionality exists in all items related causally (or, the weaker but 
similar claim that Strawson concedes, that at least genuine “aboutness” 
exists in all items related causally) is no doubt to attempt to answer the 
call for theoretical unification.  Unification, on this kind of view, is 
achieved by stating that aboutness is ubiquitous, whereas intentionality is 
something like a “special case” of aboutness unique to conscious 
experience.  The important question, however, is whether or not 
Strawson’s move works: Do we get the ingredients for a unified theory of 
minds in the world by claiming that there are two kinds of aboutness, or 
does Strawson concede too much?   
According to Strawson, one kind of aboutness—intentionality—is a 
feature only of occurrent conscious states, because only they have 
phenomenal content.  So what is it about phenomenal content that 
provides the kind of aboutness needed for intentionality?   
 
                                       
73 Only if you accept this distinction between kinds of aboutness. 
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As Montague points out, some theorists believe that all 
phenomenal content is sensory in nature (e.g., all of our experiences are 
exhaustively explicable in terms of sensory qualities), while others believe 
there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenal content (i.e., an aspect of 
the totality of experience that is not exhaustively explained by its sensory 
qualities, such as entertaining the conceptual content of sentences while 
reading, memories, fears, beliefs, etc.).   
For Strawson, not only is there such a thing as cognitive 
phenomenal content, this kind of content is a crucial player in the 
determination of any intentional state.  He thinks cognitive phenomenal 
content is that feature that gives us the kind of aboutness that is 
intentionality.  To understand this feature of the overall phenomenal 
content of a conscious subject, consider an example Strawson himself 
uses.  Imagine one has a perceptual experience of a moose, M, which 
came about by ordinary means (i.e., by a visual experience caused by M, 
or even of a photograph of M).  How do we distinguish the content of our 
intentional state from the overall content of our phenomenal experience?  
Or in Strawson’s terminology, “how do we—how does intentionality—
know where to stop?”74  This has come to be known as the “stopping 
problem”, and the problem lies in explaining how the specific content of 
an intentional state is determined, or how it is that a subject’s intentional 
state is “only and precisely about” what it is said to be about, given the 
                                       
74 Strawson, Real Intentionality 3, 296. 
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rest of the phenomenal content that produced the experience of M.  Why 
is the intentional state about M, and not, for instance, about only a part 
of M, or M and M’s environment, or perhaps the light which is affecting 
the subject’s retina in the perception of M, or the neural activity which 
occurs directly before the thought of M arises75?       
 Strawson argues that we have to acknowledge cognitive 
phenomenal content in order to answer the stopping problem, and to 
explain intentionality.  He argues that the only way we can achieve the 
required determinateness of an intentional state is with something like an 
active cognitive feature “built in to the character of experience.”76  What 
he means is that there must be some feature or mechanism of the overall 
content of our experience which is not sensory in nature, but which is 
marked by cognition.  By this I understand him to mean some form of 
cognitive contribution to perception made by the subject.   
If he is right about the existence of a cognitive element in the 
totality of experience, then it makes sense that this element is 
responsible for the determinateness of particular intentional states.  
Strawson proposes a “taking mechanism”, whereby subjects “take” their 
experience to be about something determinate.  This built-in feature of 
our mental lives is what determines the specific content of each 
                                       
75 Strawson, Real Intentionality, 296. 
76 Strawson, Real Intentionality, 297. He adds: “Cognitive experience of the sort I am 
focusing on at present is a matter of whatever EQ [experiential qualitative] content is 
involved in episodes of consciously entertaining and understanding specific cognitive or 
conceptual contents after one has subtracted any sensory-affective content.” Strawson, 
Real Intentionality, 293. 
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intentional state (e.g., properties are “taken” to be of a certain individual), 
in varied degrees of determinateness.  So on this account, a subject, from 
their overall phenomenal content, “takes” their perceptual experience to 
be about some particular.  The subject “takes” their experience to be 
about M (i.e., cognizes under the description “that moose”) and not 
nothing and not anything else, for instance, and this can only be 
achieved, Strawson says, via the taking mechanism, which alone can 
produce intentionality.  Thus, according to Strawson, it is cognitive 
phenomenal content, which is a feature of phenomenal content and is 
only present in conscious experience, that determines what a state is 
about (i.e., gives us “the right kind” of aboutness), and is thus required 
for intentionality. 
Yet, this taking mechanism, while explaining how we might 
determine what particular thoughts are about, does not tell us how 
phenomenal content, and consequently intentional content, produces the 
kind of aboutness that is a feature of occurrent conscious states alone.  
Searle, however, does provide such an account.  He refutes externalist 
theories of meaning that assume that, because of the causal role the 
world plays in our having the mental content we have, “intentional 
content is in large part constituted by the (external) causal relations that 
the agent has to the world and not by the (internal) features of the 
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mind/brain.”77  Searle recognizes that the reason our intentional states 
are about the things they are about (e.g., the reason our thought is about 
that moose) and not something else or nothing at all, is because we stand 
in a particular causal relation to them78.  However, this is not because 
what a thought is about is part of that content, it is because those states 
stand in an indexical relation to what caused them, in which the 
intentional content one has is caused by that thing in the world it is 
about.  It is because an intentional state is caused by M that it is about M, 
while any conceptual impositions (like a taking mechanism) merely serve 
to determine the “boundaries” of our particular thoughts.  Furthermore, if 
indexicality is a result of certain causal relations, then why don’t ordinary 
causes and effects “index” one another?  The reason is that mental states 
have something ordinary causes and effects do not: information about 
those causal relations they are a part of. 
 Strawson is at least right, then, to claim that intentionality is a 
feature of experiential conscious states alone.  And since phenomenal 
content represents properties, and since properties cannot exist on their 
own, we “take” certain phenomenal content to be “of” the particular that 
has those properties79.  Given Searle’s account of causal indexicality, we 
also have an account of why only conscious subjects can have intentional 
                                       
77 Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction, 179. 
78 Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction, 185. 
79 Even though Strawson assumes it plays a greater role in intentionality, I think that it 
is best to construe the taking mechanism as a conceptual matter.  We take our 
experiences to be about a particular in the sense that we perceive properties that are 
organized by concepts.    
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content, and how conscious states are about the things they are about, 
and hence have intentionality at all (i.e., because conscious states stand 
in a particular causal and informational relation to the world). 
However, we should evaluate Strawson’s earlier claim that 
aboutness is, in one sense, ubiquitous, and that it is the other kind of 
aboutness that is intentionality.  On his view, because at least one form 
of aboutness is ubiquitous, it is a candidate for a unifying principle that 
would give us a unified account of minds in the world.  I would like to 
propose, however, that in his claim that there are two kinds of aboutness, 
one ubiquitous and one a feature of conscious states alone, there is a 
subtle, yet important shortcoming that exhibits Strawson’s confusion 
about certain crucial concepts he employs.  
 
4.3 Strengthening Strawson’s account 
 
 There is a way to avoid the ubiquity problem altogether, which 
denies the postulation of two kinds of aboutness.  The ubiquity problem 
is created, for Strawson, precisely because he argues that there is a sense 
in which terms related causally are about one another, and hence that 
genuine intentionality might be ubiquitous.  He thinks that maintaining 
that “effects carry information about their causes”, and presumably vice 
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versa80, entails that terms related causally are informational of one 
another, and therefore about one another in some ordinary way.  Hence, 
Strawson must distinguish this aboutness from what he thinks is another 
kind of aboutness that is a feature only of intentional states, in order to 
reject the claim that intentionality is ubiquitous.  However, what entitles 
him to speak of information in causal relations in this way? 
One might speculate that Strawson is influenced by his father’s 
work on causation and explanation, and the wider debate about the 
relations between causal and explanatory descriptions.  P.F. Strawson 
argues, “In observing [any characteristically causal] transaction one 
already possesses the explanation of the new state of affairs.”81  
However, this claim can be interpreted in different ways.  On the weaker 
interpretation, the idea is that observing a causal transaction gives the 
observer an explanation of the effect of that transaction.  What this 
means is that because causation is a relational concept, to understand an 
event as a cause is to already characterize it in terms of its effect, as the 
concept of an event qua cause necessarily includes the concept of an 
event qua effect, and vice versa.   
On the stronger interpretation, which appears to be Galen 
Strawson’s, the idea is that because effects carry information about their 
causes, and vice versa, the objects and events themselves are explanatory 
                                       
80 On this view, one is also forced to concede that causes would carry information about 
their effects.  
81 P.F. Strawson, “Causation and Explanation,” Essays on Davison: Actions and Events 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 121. 
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of one another.  And from this, the idea that causes and effects are 
themselves about one another in some ordinary way seems to follow. 
It appears that P.F Strawson thinks that causation is an explanatory 
or informational relation in a weaker sense, and reconciles this with the 
fact that causation is a natural relation in the following way: 
 
We sometimes presume, or are said to presume, that causality is a natural 
relation which holds in the natural world between particular events or 
circumstances just as the relation of temporal succession does or that of 
spatial proximity.  We also, and rightly, associate causality with explanation.  
But if causality is a relation that holds in the natural world, explanation is a 
different matter.  We also speak of one thing explaining, or being the 
explanation, of another thing, as if explaining was a relation in the sense in 
which we perhaps think of causality as a natural relation.  It is an intellectual 
or rational or intensional relation.  It does not hold between things in the 
natural world, things to which we can assign places and times in nature.  It 
holds between facts or truths.82 
 
I think the proper way to interpret these concepts is to 
acknowledge that while there is a sense in which the relata of a causal 
interaction carry information about one another83, explanation (i.e., 
information that is symbolized and interpreted by a subject) is only 
present in beings sufficiently like us, namely with sufficient causal power 
                                       
82 Strawson, Causation and Explanation, 115. 
83 The sense required by causal statements like “x happened because of y” or “y made x 
happen”. 
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to be informationally affected as we are.  So understood, it would be a 
mistake to assume that because causation is in a sense an informational 
relation (i.e., properties of the cause and effect are “informative” of the 
nature of their causal transaction) that the relata in a causal relation 
themselves are explanatory of one another, in the sense that they are 
therefore about one another as is the case with intentional states.  The 
ideas that conscious beings possess of the relata of a causal relation are 
informational about one another in a much stronger sense.  Galen 
Strawson’s confusion about the implications of causal and explanatory 
relations is precisely what creates the ubiquity problem for him, because 
he thinks that granting that there is an informational relation among 
objects implies ascriptions of aboutness, and the possibility of the 
ubiquity of intentionality (i.e., in all items related causally).  In ordinary 
garden-variety causation, a billiard ball, for instance, has certain 
properties such that when it interacts with another billiard ball with 
certain other properties, a particular change occurs.  Thus, an effect is an 
object or event that is determined by the object or event that is its cause, 
and is therefore in a sense informative of that cause, because the 
properties of each relata, the objects and events in the natural world, 
determine the nature of the change that occurs upon their interaction.  So 
we can grant a sense in which there is information in ordinary causation 
(i.e., the properties of a cause are informative of the properties of its 
effect, and vice versa), yet this does not entail intentionality.  Thinking of 
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causes themselves as being informational in the sense that gives us 
intentionality, is an illicit projection of features of our representations of 
objects and events as causes and effects onto the objects and events 
themselves.   
If this is right, then the fact that causation and information are 
ubiquitous does not mean that aboutness and intentionality are.  And in 
fact, causation is ubiquitous and informational: the world is thoroughly 
causal, and causation is the natural relation of change, each particular 
instance of which is determined by the properties of the objects and 
events involved.  However, there is an important difference when beings 
sufficiently similar to us are involved in causal interactions: one of the 
effects that things have on us, given the properties that comprise our 
nature (e.g., the causal power of the central nervous system), is the 
representation or symbolization of information about that interaction. 
Given what persons are (i.e., rational agents), consciousness must 
be informational of the world.  What does this mean?  Consciousness is a 
natural effect of the causal interaction of some natural biological systems 
with the world they inhabit.  Conscious experience is produced via 
ordinary causal interaction between such systems and their environment, 
where again, the properties of the objects and events that make up a 
cause and its effect will determine (are informative of) the nature of that 
interaction.  One such system is the human central nervous system.  
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Consciousness is a causally emergent84 property of such physiological 
systems, (and, presumably, of anything causally equivalent); it is the 
result of the ability to represent or symbolize information about our 
causal interactions with the world, given the causal power of the human 
central nervous system to be so affected by things in its environment.  
Only in consciousness is information symbolizable, and therefore useful 
for the subject that possesses it.  Brains-like-ours fully causally 
enmeshed in a world-like-this are causally sufficient conditions for 
consciousness.   
Furthermore, conscious experience always has content; conscious 
experience is always the conscious experience of something.  There are 
no contentless conscious states.  Every conscious state is informational of 
its causal origins, and is therefore informational of its cause, even if it is 
not always veridical of its intentional object.  In standard cases of sense 
perception, a conscious perceptual state has its causal origins as its 
object.  As Searle points out, to have a conscious experience of some 
object is for that object to have caused that experience85.  In non-
perceptual cases as well (i.e., pains, hallucinations, etc.), and thoughts 
that contain vacuous terms, conscious states are informational of their 
                                       
84 Emergence is a natural causal relation, although it is not to be understood as ordinary 
event causation.  It is a species of causation in which “the cause is simultaneous with the 
effect.”  Conscious experience is emergent from (i.e., caused and sustained by) lower 
level brain processes, and is thus a system level feature of the brain.  Searle, Mind: A 
Brief Introduction, 124. 
85 In Searle’s terminology: “What makes my belief have the content that Caesar crossed 
the Rubicon is the fact that it will be satisfied if and only if Caesar crossed the Rubicon.  
The content of the intentional state is exactly that which makes it have the conditions of 
satisfaction it does.” Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction, 189-190.  
 71 
cause, yet with different degrees of articulateness86.  Pains are not 
therefore purely qualitative experiences (exhaustively accountable in 
terms of qualitative features), as it is sometimes argued (e.g., by Searle), 
but rather are informational and therefore intentional states, yet are often 
not articulate enough for the subject in pain, for example, to identify the 
cause of the pain in any detail.  Pains are often informative simply of the 
fact that some damage has occurred to one’s body, but they are 
informative nonetheless87.  As for hallucinations, there are a number of 
ways that information about the cause of a conscious experience may be 
distorted so as to not be sufficiently identificatory of the causal origins of 
the experience (e.g., the result of pathology or the use of drugs).  And 
thoughts containing vacuous terms (e.g., thoughts about unicorns, which 
originate from mistaken implications drawn from the discovery of 
narwhal tusks) are also informational of their cause and are therefore 
intentional states.  Here, ordinary information is symbolized and 
manipulated via standard mental operations (e.g., imagination), and thus 
may not refer to anything real; but the thought nevertheless represents 
the causal origin of that information.  In every case of a conscious state, 
that state is informational of what caused it, albeit with different degrees 
of articulateness.  Anything physiologically similar will have similar 
                                       
86 By this, I mean the degrees to which information enables a subject to veridically 
identify the causal origin of a particular conscious experience.   
87 Even in cases where the cause of the pain is unknown, information is still available to 
the subject in pain (e.g., was it a burn or a cut?). 
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conscious qualities, and any physiologies that are causally dissimilar are 
likely to have informationally dissimilar conscious experiences.  
So, because only conscious states are informational of the 
properties of objects and events in the world that cause those states, only 
conscious states are intentional.  Only in creatures sufficiently similar are 
the properties of a particular cause “made conscious” (i.e., symbolized), 
and hence only then is there aboutness, and consequently, intentionality.  
Coval and Campbell have argued that “if we are to be actors in the 
world, consciousness, which does envelope us, must be informational 
about the world.”88  Without information, for example, the family of 
action concepts we use would be without application: we could not act, 
know that we had acted, and know, when we fail, that we have failed and 
why.  Because persons are able to act in the world and have the 
experiences they do, it must be the case that consciousness connects 
persons to the world via information about the world.  The term 
‘intentionality’ should be reserved for this symbolizing of the properties 
of particular objects and events in the world that causally impinge on a 
subject.  Symbolized information is produced in conscious beings when 
the properties of objects and events are made conscious.  What this 
means is that intentionality is the conscious effect that the properties of 
objects and events in the world have on conscious agents like us.  We 
can, once symbolized, store and recall this information, contribute to it 
                                       
88  Coval and Campbell, A Critique of the Liberal Idea of a Person, 33. 
 73 
and even create information with no real-world correspondence, (e.g., 
thoughts about unicorns) through the manipulation of information.  But 
only thoughts themselves are intrinsically intentional.   
This account is given additional support because it is consistent 
with what we know generally about evolution.  If consciousness is the 
informational result of a subject’s causal interaction with the world, 
where the properties of objects and events are “made conscious” (i.e., 
information about the world is symbolized by a subject) then the 
evolutionary advantage is huge89.  The more information we have, the 
better we can interact effectively with the world, the more goals we can 
set and achieve, etc.  Increased information makes for an increased 
repertoire of behaviours.  On the other hand, we cannot act at all without 
information, and the entire family of concepts that surround action would 
have no application (e.g., action, mistake, success, failure, etc.; concepts 
without which we could make no sense of our lives).  Consciousness and 
its operations, including thinking, has a logic: it is for action90.  
Consciousness, being informational, is thus internally related to the 
world. 
 
 
 
                                       
89 Not to mention the advantages of the ability to represent and share that information 
with language. 
90 The “new cogito”: I act-therefore I think. Coval and Campbell, A Critique of the 
Liberal Idea of a Person, 36. 
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3. Conclusions 
 
I have formulated a naturalistic, informational theory of consciousness 
that also outlines an account of intentionality.  Consciousness is 
informational of the world, and it is therefore intentional.  And 
intentionality, the property that each individual mental state has because 
it is informational in this way, is a natural effect of certain systems’ 
causal interaction with their environment.  In their complex causal 
interactions with the world, persons are caused to symbolize information 
about these interactions, given their physiology and the nature of the 
world they occupy.  Furthermore, the categories of thought allow persons 
to organize information into discrete, useful packages.  They are useful 
because they correspond to the world in which we live and otherwise act. 
So, contrary to Searle’s view that there are some non-intentional 
conscious states (e.g., general anxiety, pains and tickles, etc.), if we have 
symbolized information about the world (i.e., if we are conscious), we 
necessarily have an intentional state, regardless of its degree of 
articulateness.  Consciousness is the effect of the causal immersion of 
certain complex biological entities in complex environments.  In 
consciousness, information about the properties of objects and events in 
the world that causally affect us are symbolized.  And so thoughts are 
always informational and therefore about something, some feature of the 
world as it naturally affects the conscious being.  Being informational in 
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this sense means being about something.  The specificity of intentional 
content can come in degrees, and certain identificatory confusions might 
be the result of less articulate intentional states.  Nevertheless, all 
thinking requires content, regardless of its clarity and distinctness.  
Searle’s suggestion that “a state of anxiety or nervousness where [one] 
does not know what [one] is anxious or nervous about and may not be 
anxious or nervous about anything” is a case of a non-intentional 
conscious state is wrong91.  Its being conscious means it is intentional.  It 
has a cause; the cause is what it is about, but the conscious state is not 
sufficiently informational for the subject to identify that cause.  All 
conscious states “speak” of their causes, yet sometimes what they say is 
too inarticulate to enable the subject to identify those causes. 
 I have tried to strengthen Galen Strawson’s account of 
intentionality.  In doing so, we can see that he is missing an important 
point.  Strawson argues that intentionality requires consciousness (hence, 
intentionality entails consciousness).  But there is more.  If consciousness 
is thoroughly informational, and information is intentional when 
symbolized in consciousness, then it follows that all conscious states 
have intentionality because they are informational in this way.  In other 
words, if we are conscious, we have symbolized information, and this 
information is intentional (i.e., it is about the thing that caused it).  Thus, 
intentionality entails consciousness, and consciousness entails 
                                       
91 Searle, Making the Social World, 26. 
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intentionality.  And this is why an informational account of intentionality 
has such broad implications in the philosophy of mind: consciousness, 
information and intentionality are inextricably related conceptually. 
Consequently, there are certain advantages that this view has over 
the views of our Cartesian ancestors.  It appears that the traditional 
question posed in the philosophy of mind (i.e., what is a mind and how 
are minds related to bodies?) is poorly constructed.  The mind is not 
isolatable as the question implies; the ghost in the machine no longer 
haunts us.  If we want insight into the nature of consciousness we must 
understand the crucial sense in which consciousness is relational, and 
proceed by analyzing the relations that produce conscious experience of 
the world.  So the question becomes: how is it that certain biological 
entities are related (presumably causally) to the world such that 
consciousness is produced?  One significant part of that answer is the 
relation of intentionality. 
Finally, establishing an account that can theoretically unify minds 
and the world has been understood throughout the present work as a 
criterion for success in the philosophy of mind.  Can one, given what has 
been done here, provide such a unified theory?  I think the ingredients 
are here.  My method of unification is Naturalism, which, properly 
understood, asserts that philosophers of mind have to start by 
acknowledging what must be the case given what we know about 
ourselves and the world.  This allows us to proceed under the assumption 
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that however we understand consciousness, it is always inextricably 
related to, unified with, the world.  Moreover, given that the universe is 
thoroughly causal, we can understand consciousness in causal terms, and 
provide a detailed explanation of how it all happens. Consciousness (and 
thus necessarily intentionality) results from the causal interactions of 
certain biological entities and the world those entities occupy, and is 
informational of those interactions.  And the fact that we are 
informationally related to the world in this way is undeniable: we could 
not be the kinds of things we are if we did not get information from the 
world.  Again, given the unique properties of certain biological entities, a 
unique effect is produced as a result of its ordinary causal interaction 
with the world.  That effect is consciousness: a natural, relational, 
informational, intentional phenomenon. 
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